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Elena Maslovskaya, Nizhny Novgorod / Russia 
 
Jeffrey Alexander’s Theory of the Civil Sphere Between Philosophy and 
Sociology of Law 
 
Abstract:  Alexander’s  theory  of  the  civil  sphere  can  be  placed  in  the  context  of  development  of 
sociology of law. However, Alexander draws not so much on sociological theories but rather on the 
approaches of philosophy of law, particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin and Habermas. The civil 
sphere is presented by Alexander as the embodiment of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locating law 
within civil morality Alexander reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to Dworkin’s position. Drawing 
on Fuller’s works Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of the democratic order. At the 
same time for Alexander the source of morality of law is not the legal system itself but a certain level 
of civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the 
legal norms. Alexander shares Habermas’s understanding of law as a regulative mechanism affecting 
all spheres of social life. However, Habermas is more sensitive to the danger of colonization of law by 
the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. Alexander’s approach can be contrasted 
with  Luhmann’s  sociological  theory  of  law.  Alexander  concentrates  on  interrelation  and  mutual 
penetration  of  the  civil  sphere  and  law  while  Luhmann  regards  law  as  an  autonomous  system 
following  its  own  logic.  While  Alexander  claims  that  his  theory  is  rooted  both  in  sociology  and 
philosophy of law in fact his approach is closer to normative philosophy. 
Keywords: Jeffrey Alexander, civil sphere, law, legal norms, solidarity, democracy 
 
Introduction 
In contemporary sociology of law the contribution of Talkott Parsons to this field of research 
is  often  emphasized.
1  In  Parsons’s  works  a  sociological  approach  to  law  was  formulated 
which differed from sociological jurisprudence. His interest to the legal sphere was stimulated 
by his interaction with Roscoe Pound in the 1930s and with Lon Fuller in the 1960s. But the 
decisive role in formation of Parsons’s approach was played by the classical traditions of 
European  sociology  of  law.  First  of  all  Parsons  synthesized  the  sociological  theories  of 
Durkheim and Weber. 
There was a growth of interest in Parsons’s ideas in American sociology in the 1980s 
when neo-functionalism as a new sociological paradigm emerged. However, this approach 
was  at  first  underrepresented  in  the  sphere  of  sociology  of  law.  Neo-functionalists  dealt 
mainly  with  the  problems  of  political  sociology,  economic  sociology,  sociology  of 
                                                           
1 Mathey Deflem, Sociology of Law: Visions of a Scholarly Tradition, 2008; A. Javier Trevino, Introduction, in: 
Talcott Parsons on Law and the Legal System, ed. A. Trevino, 2008, 1– 36. 2 
professions and so on. Thus Jeffrey Alexander first worked out a new approach in cultural 
sociology  which  went  beyond  neo-functionalism  and  only  after  that  he  turned  to  the 
problematic of sociology of law. 
In the 1990s Alexander often referred to insufficiency of neo-functionalism since that 
approach had already played its role in rehabilitation and reconstruction of Parsons’s theory. 
During that period Alexander started to work out his theory of the civil sphere. However, he 
remained ‘rooted in Parsons’s theoretical concerns’.
2 According to Alexander, an important 
contribution to macro-sociology that was made by Parsons was the elaboration of the concept 
of  ‘societal  community’.  Nevertheless,  Parsons’s  ideas  had  to  be  complemented  by  other 
theoretical approaches, including those of micro-sociology such as ethnomethodology. But in 
his discussion of the issues of sociology of law Alexander draws mainly on other theoretical 
sources, sociological and philosophical. 
 
I. The Theory of the Civil Sphere 
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere is based on different perspectives in philosophy and 
sociological theory. In terms of philosophy Alexander refers to ‘post-Marxist, neo-Kantian 
democratic  idealism  of  Habermas’.
3  He  also  mentions  Foucault’s  critique  of  the 
Enlightenment rationalism. But, unlike Foucault, Alexander believes that knowledge can be 
separated from power and such a separation leaves open a possibility for critical thinking and 
a more just social order. 
In the sphere of sociological theory Alexander follows ‘the often suppressed, and almost 
always  neglected,  democratic  thread  in  Durkheim,  Weber  and  Parsons’
4  which  is 
complemented by the Marxian idea of contradictions within the civil sphere. On the whole 
Alexander emphasizes his connection with the classical sociological tradition as well as his 
desire to overcome some shortcomings of the classical theories. 
Alexander  defines  the  civil  sphere  as  ‘a  social  sphere  or  field  organized  around  a 
particular kind of solidarity, one whose members are symbolically represented as independent 
and self-motivating persons individually responsible for their actions, yet also as actors who 
feel themselves, at the same time, bound by collective obligations to all the other individuals 
who  compose  this  sphere’.
5  Thus  Alexander  proposes  to  consider  the  civil  sphere  as  an 
                                                           
2 Peter Kivisto, In Search of the Social Space for Solidarity and Justice: Review Essay, Thesis Eleven 91 (2007), 
110. 
3 JeffreyAlexander, The Long and Winding Road: Civil Repair of Intimate Injustice, Sociological Theory 19 
(2001), 371. 
4 Alexander (note 3), 372. 
5 Jeffrey Alexander, Theorizing the “Modes of Incorporation”: Assimilation, Hyphenation and Multiculturalism 3 
analytically independent social sphere which ‘articulates a distinctive cultural discourse via 
specific institutional activities and a specific solidary logic’.
6 
The structure of the civil sphere is formed by discursive and institutional frameworks. 
The  former  is  represented  by  the  democratic  discourse  which  reveals  the  meaning  of 
citizenship, the nature of democratic society and the characteristics of its oppon ents. The 
distinction between members of the civil sphere and outsiders is made on the basis of the 
universalistic values. Thus the democratic discourse is characterized by the existence of a 
binary code. The ‘otherness’ of outsiders is constructed in the terms of civil incompetence and 
their exclusion is seen as a means of strengthening the existing order and defense of the civil 
sphere. 
The institutional  level  of the civil  sphere includes  public opinion, elections,  political 
parties  and  new  social  movements.  The  main  means  of  influence  of  public  opinion  is 
persuasion.
7 The efficiency of elections, political parties and social movements in maintaining 
the boundaries of the civil sphere is achieved by the use of law. Thus civil criteria can enter 
into other social institutions, but Alexander emphasizes that preservation of the civil sphere 
requires continuous collective efforts. 
On the whole Alexander considers the civil sphere in a society which is characterized by 
a high degree of social differentiation.  Apparently he shares the ideas of theorists of social 
differentiation  –  from  Durkheim  to  Parsons  –  on  interrelation  between  structural 
differentiation and civil emancipation.
8 In Alexander’s analytical model each of the relatively 
autonomous social spheres presumably possesses its own criterion of justice, set of values and 
membership criteria. Competition between them is possible in the conditions of differentiation 
and plurality. The asymmetrical character of relations between different spheres presupposes 
the way of establishing preference for a certain standard of justice. The priority of the civil 
sphere over other social spheres is justified on the basis of the dichotomy ‘sacral/profane’ 
which is characteristic for the ‘strong program’ of cultural sociology. 
According to Alexander, the civil sphere embodies the principles of equality and justice 
while various forms of injustice emerge in other social spheres. As a result the problem of 
maintaining the boundaries of the civil sphere and opposing the influence of economic and 
political structures is constantly reproduced. One of the aims of the civil discourse is to reveal 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of inequality in other social spheres. The degree of influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
as Varieties of Civil Participation, Sociological Theory 19 (2001), 239. 
6 Giuseppe Sciortino, Bringing Solidarity back in: Review Essay, European Journal of Social Theory 10 (2007), 
563. 
7 Jeffrey Alexander, The Civil Sphere, 2006, 151. 
8 Sciortino (note 6), 569. 4 
the civil sphere on the political and economic sub-systems largely depends on the activities of 
social movements practicing some form of ‘civil repair’. 
As Alexander argues, social movements are capable of transforming and enlarging the 
civil sphere. However, they should be capable to prove before the public opinion that their 
values are compatible with the universalist values of the civil sphere. Social movements can 
initiate changes but their implementation requires certain social institutions like the media, 
elections  and  the  judicial  system.  In  this  context  Alexander  discusses  the  problematic  of 
sociology of law. 
 
II. The Role of Law in the Civil Sphere 
In Alexander’s view, the most influential legal theories ‘have tended to bracket out the law’s 
moral and civil role’.
9 This was characteristic for Hans Kelsen and representatives of realism 
in American jurisprudence. On the other hand, Alexander rejects the approach of Critical 
Legal Studies that regards law as an instrument of power. According to Alexander, all these 
different  and  often  antagonistic  traditions  commonly  ignore  ‘the  cultural  dimension  of 
democratic law’.
10 However, this dimension of law has been emphasized in the works of 
Ronald Dworkin. 
The conceptual program offered by Dworkin is based on the idea of ‘law as integrity’.
11 
According to Dworkin, law includes not only norms but also directives aimed at common 
good and principles which motivate decision making. Democratic law presupposes interaction 
of  these  principles  and  the  unity  of  principles  and  actions.  Dworkin  connects  law  with 
morality and regards the history of law as realization of the principles of justice. Like the 
followers of the doctrine of natural law, Dworkin admits that the source of obligation to obey 
the  law  is  the  moral  foundations  of  the  legal  system.  However,  he  believes  that  these 
foundations are not some abstract ideal standards but concrete principles of political morality 
which are characteristic for a certain society.
12 
In  Alexander’s  theory  the  civil  sphere  is  the  embodiment  of  Dworkin’s  principal 
integrity.  It is not the judge or court as institution but the autonomous social sphere that 
concretizes the meaning of law or precedent. Alexander emphasizes the cultural bases of legal 
norms, their connection with civil values and the need to draw on the democratic discourse of 
                                                           
9 Alexander (note 7), 157. 
10 Alexander (note 7), 159. 
11 Ronald M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986. 
12 Dworkin (note 11), 96-102. 5 
the civil sphere. He shares the viewpoint of Habermas who regards law as one of the main 
forms of symbolic representation of civil solidarity.
13 
According to Alexander, legal norms are embedded in the binary logic of the civil 
sphere. As a re sult, law not only can justify social exclusion but also can serve as an 
instrument of correction of the previous exclusion. Alexander admits that the activities of 
excluded social groups aimed at changing the cultural classifications are formally illegal.
14 
However, due to changing public opinion and the force of democratic discourse the conditions 
for  ‘civil  repair’  can  emerge.  The  fact  that  law  is  localized  within  civil  solidarity  also 
demonstrates  the  similarity  of  Alexander’s  position  with  Dworkin’s  theory.  Although 
Alexander  accepts  that  in  a  secularized  pluralistic  society  law  is  largely  separated  from 
morality, he believes that the theory of differentiated civil sphere allows us to reveal the moral 
limitations on the functioning of law. 
Alexander argues that in a democratic society law defends both the individual and the 
collective interests. Law acts as a mechanism which forms universalist solidarity and clarifies 
its application in specific cases.
15 Legal mechanisms can influence different social sphe res, 
for  example,  preventing  family  violence  or  regulating  work  conflicts.  The  degree  of 
interference of legal institutions into conflict situations is largely defined by the boundary 
between  the  civil  sphere  and  other  social  spheres.  As  Alexander  believes ,  the  more 
differentiated and autonomous the civil sphere becomes the less rigid is its boundary with 
other spheres. This allows for carrying out ‘civil repair’ including the widening of rights of 
the social groups that had previously been discriminated. 
In Alexander’s view, democratic constitution represents the clearest example of legal 
regulation of the relationships between civil society and other social spheres. ‘In democratic 
societies, constitutions aim to regulate governing and lawmaking in such a manner that they 
contribute to solidarity of a civil kind.
16 Like in most other cases, Alexander refers to the 
American example and mentions the fifth amendment to the U.S. constitution. 
Drawing on the works of Lon Fuller Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of 
a democratic legal order. Fuller’s position is close to the functionalist understanding of law as 
social control. Fuller devoted special attention to working out the prescriptions of how to 
make law more efficient.
17 At the same time, according to Fuller, law contains the moral core 
which is deduced from the logic of the legal system. 
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For Alexander the source of the inner morality of law is a certain level of civil solidarity. 
In a democratic society law is subject to control by the civil sphere. As Alexander notes, the 
relation between legal norms and social facts ‘is a matter for civil interpretation. It is not a 
matter  for  scientific  determination  or  of  simple  assertion  by  the  state.  Only  after  being 
interpreted inside the civil sphere can law be forcefully applied’.
18 
 
III. Some Difficulties of Alexander’s Approach 
Alexander is aware that his description of law corresponds only to the realities of a genuinely 
democratic society. In other social conditions legal institutions are used systematically by the 
members  of  the  ruling  elite  who  pursue  their  own  interests.  This  possibility  has  been 
discussed many times by representatives of the Critical Legal Studies. From the viewpoint of 
that approach the idea of equality before the law has been questioned. It has been argued that 
the  legal  institutions  reflect  and  reinforce  the  existing  economic,  political  and  social 
inequality. However, Alexander regards this approach as one-sided, at least in relation to 
American society. On the other hand, he admits that in American history the principle of the 
rule of law has also been used as a façade for economic exploitation and racial segregation. 
The main example of this, in his view, was the factual exclusion of African Americans from 
political life of the Southern states after the Civil War which was accompanied by following 
the formal legal procedures.
19 
It should be noted that Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere is based first of all on 
analysis of the social processes in American society. However, its applicability in other socio-
cultural contexts can be questioned. This theory presupposes a high degree of autonomy of 
the civil sphere in relation to economic and political institutions but it remains unclear how 
this autonomy can be guaranteed. Alexander presents the influence of the civil sphere on 
other social spheres as always positive while he regards the influence in the opposite direction 
as largely negative. It is also noteworthy that for Alexander the civil sphere is thoroughly 
secularized although this is not actually the case in American society. It has been argued that 
Alexander does not pay sufficient attention to the challenge of religious fundamentalism to 
the secular institutions and ideologies of the civil sphere.
20 
Alexander also discusses the civil sphere in the conditions of globalization. As he claims, 
the main actors at the international arena are still the nation -states and international law 
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protects national sovereignty rather than human rights. At the global level civil society does 
not  possess  such  institutions  as  independent  court  and  elections  which  allow  the  public 
opinion to control the power of the state.
21 At the same time he believes that world public 
opinion represented in the media is exerting increasing influence on th e political institutions. 
Thus there is still a possibility of creating a global civil sphere. On the other hand, critics of 
Alexander’s theory refer to the existence of various ethnic and religious enclaves with deep 
cultural differences even on the level of particular states.
22 
 
IV. Alexander’s Theory of the Civil Sphere and Contemporary Sociology of Law 
The  theory  of  the  civil  sphere  has  been  characterized  as  an  important  contribution  to 
contemporary sociology of law.
23 However, Alexander’s discussion of the legal aspects of the 
civil sphere draws not so much on sociological theories of law but rather on ideas of legal 
philosophers like Dworkin and Fuller. At the same time Alexander’s approach has much in 
common  with  the  socio-legal  theory  of  Juergen  Habermas  which  combines  different 
perspectives of philosophy and sociology of law.
24 
Both Habermas and Alexander are seeking to create new versions of critical theory 
which transcend functionalism, on the one hand, and the radical versions of critical theory, for 
example, represented by Foucault, on the other hand. Following the Durkheimian tradition, 
Habermas and Alexander discuss the moral foundations of the legal order. Like Habermas, 
Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the legal norms. In  Habermas’s 
viewpoint, the legitimacy of the legal norms is guaranteed only by democratic procedures. 
According  to  Alexander,  this  legitimacy  is  guaranteed  by  reflection  in  the  law  of  the 
universalist  civil  values  and  the  principles  of  justice  and  equality.  Both  Habermas  and 
Alexander understand law as an important regulative mechanism that influences all spheres of 
social life. But, unlike Alexander, Habermas is aware of the danger of colonization of the 
lifeworld by the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. 
Alexander’s theory can also be compared with Luhmann’s sociology of law since both 
scholars drew on the functionalist tradition, although they developed it in different directions. 
While  Luhmann has  worked out  a sociological  theory  of law as an  autopoietic system,
25 
Alexander  has  relied  on  sociological  theory  as  well  as  philosophy  of  law.  Luhmann 
                                                           
21 Jeffrey Alexander, Globalization as Collective Representation: The New Dream of a Cosmopolitan Civil 
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22 Turner (note 20), 180. 
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25 Niklas Luhmann, Law as Social System, 2004. 8 
emphasizes the autonomy of the legal subsystem in relation to other subsystems. Alexander 
considers the interaction of legal institutions and the civil sphere and discusses their mutual 
influence and interpenetration. For Alexander civil morality forms the foundation of the legal 
order. In contrast to this, Luhmann regards modern law as completely free from the influence 
of moral norms and following its own inner logic. 
An original contribution to sociology of law has been offered by Bourdieu
26 in his theory 
of the juridical field. This sociologist analyzes the formation and development of the juridical 
field in a broad social context. His approach i s more empirically oriented than most other 
perspectives in today’s sociology of law. Bourdieu focuses on interaction in the legal sphere 
between groups possessing different interests and resources. He considers the impact of other 
social  fields,  particularly the economic and the political,  on the juridical  field.  Luhmann, 
Habermas and Alexander have analyzed mostly the western societies characterized by a high 
degree of functional differentiation between the political and the legal subsystems. Bourdieu’s 
theory  can  be  used  for  the  study  of  legal  institutions  under  different  political  regimes, 
democratic and non-democratic. Apparently Bourdieu has offered a more radical version of 
critical theory in sociology of law than Alexander’s version. 
On the whole, Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere occupies an intermediate position 
between neofunctionalism and critical theory. He has been largely influenced by the theories 
of philosophy of law. In fact Alexander’s approach is closer to philosophy of law represented 
by Dworkin and Fuller than to sociology of law in the versions of Luhmann or Bourdieu. 
Today Alexander is often characterized as the founder of a school of cultural sociology
27 
rather than a new approach in sociology of law. However, he is continuing to d evelop his 
theory of the civil sphere which can stimulate further discussions of the relationship between 
different approaches in contemporary sociology and philosophy of law. 
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